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Abstract
The influence of contrarians on the noisy voter model is studied at the mean-field level. The
noisy voter model is a variant of the voter model where agents can adopt two opinions, optimistic
or pessimistic, and can change them by means of an imitation (herding) and an intrinsic (noise)
mechanisms. An ensemble of noisy voters undergoes a finite-size phase transition, upon increasing
the relative importance of the noise to the herding, form a bimodal phase where most of the agents
shear the same opinion to a unimodal phase where almost the same fraction of agent are in opposite
states. By the inclusion of contrarians we allow for some voters to adopt the opposite opinion of
other agents (anti-herding). We first consider the case of only contrarians and show that the only
possible steady state is the unimodal one. More generally, when voters and contrarians are present,
we show that the bimodal-unimodal transition of the noisy voter model prevails only if the number
of contrarians in the system is smaller than four, and their characteristic rates are small enough.
For the number of contrarians bigger or equal to four, the voters and the contrarians can be seen
only in the unimodal phase. Moreover, if the number of voters and contrarians, as well as the noise
and herding rates, are of the same order, then the probability functions of the steady state are very
well approximated by the Gaussian distribution.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, voter model, complex systems
1. Introduction
Nowadays it is quite common to model the dynamics of opinion as a complex system in terms
of agent-based models. In those models “agents” or “units” can hold different opinions that evolve
under dynamical rules that include stochastic effects. In this framework, the global behaviour of
the system can be directly linked to the microscopic mechanisms acting at the level of one or a
few agents. The voter model (VM) [1–4] and the majority rule model (MR) by Galam [5–8] are
paradigmatic examples of agent-based models where each agent can be in one of two possible
opinion states and the dynamics is driven by an imitation process. For the VM a randomly chosen
agent blindly copies the state of a neighbour, again randomly chosen, while in the MR a complete
group of randomly chosen agents adopt the opinion of the local majority. For finite systems, both
models describe an evolution towards a consensus state where all agents share the same opinion
[3, 9].
In the real world, however, perfect consensus is an exception and coexistence of opinions is
a more likely stable scenario. Both the VM and the MR have been modified in different ways in
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order to account for this more realistic situation. Among many possibilities, it has been shown
that the inclusion of inflexible agents (also known as zealots) or that of contrarians prevents the
system from reaching a perfect consensus state, allowing coexistence to prevail. Zealots are agents
that never change their opinion, their influence depending both on their number and the detailed
structure of the network of interactions[10–18]. Contrarians are agents that, contrarily to the
imitation rules described above, tend to copy the opposite opinion of a neighbor or to adopt the
opinion held by the minority of the group. Their influence on the MR was first studied by Galam
[19]. He showed that the system can reach two steady states, depending on the concentration of
contrarians: if it is small enough, an ordered phase is reached with a majority (but not all) of agents
holding one of the two opinions; while for the concentration above a critical value, a disordered
phase is reached with the same fraction of agents with different opinions (no majority). See Refs.
[20–35], amongst others, where contrarians have also been considered in other contexts.
Contrarian behaviour has been also studied within the VM, in the mean-field approximation
with all agents being neighbours, in Refs. [36, 37]. In the two-role model (TRM) of [36, 37] the
agents can choose, at each decission step, between behaving as a “voter” and then copy the opinion
of a neighbour, or behaving as a “contrarian” and adopt the opposite opinion of a neighbour, with
given probabilities 1−p and p, respectively. Observe that the situation is different from the original
model by Galam [19] where agents have fixed roles and the label of “voter” or “contrarian” of a
single agent remains unchanged during the dynamical evolution. For a system of N agents, three
phases can be observed: the bimodal phase if p < 1/(N+1), the plain phase for p = 1/(N+1), and
the unimodal phase for p > 1/(N + 1). In the bimodal phase, the system keeps most of the time
close to the consensus states, where the number of agents holding one particular opinion is much
larger than the number holding the opposite one, but the dominant opinion can change with time.
Hence, the probability distribution P(n) of the number of agents n holding a particular opinion has
maxima at n = 0 and n = N in the steady state. In the unimodal phase the number of agents in
each of the two possible states fluctuates around equal numbers and the distribtution P(n) presents
a single maximum at n = N/2. In the plain phase, P(n) is uniform for all n ∈ [0,N].
The situation of the TRM resembles that of the Kirman or noisy voter model [38–41]. In
that model there are two mechanisms that make an agent to change her binary state: the herding
or copying mechanism, as in the VM, and the intrinsic noise allowing agents to change states
regardless the sate of the remaining agents. By increasing the relative importance of the noisy
with respect to the herding, the system undergoes a finite-size phase transition from a unimodal to
a unimodal phase, similar to the one observed in the TRM with respect to the probability p.
In this work we study the effect of contrarian agents on the noisy voter model. As in Galam’s
model, agents are modeled with fixed roles that they keep at all times. The main objective is to
unveil the effects of the different mechanisms on the global behaviour of the system, specially on
the different phases the system may exhibit, as well as to clarify the similarities and differences
between the noisy voter model and the two-role model.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model and explore
some limits, particularly the case of the TRM. Section 3 contains the main results of the system:
exact and approximate theoretical expressions are compared against numerical results for simple
as well as general cases. Finally, section 4 is devoted to the conclusions.
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2. Model
The system is made of N = Nv + Nc agents. Each agent can hold any of two possible opinion
states. We do not have any particular interpretation in mind, and we will denote the two states
generically as “up” an “down”. They could account for “optimistic” and “pessimistic” states;
the “buy” and “sell” states of brokers in the stock market, or whatever other interpretation. The
suffixes v and c stands for the voters and the contrarians, respectively. We assume all agents inside
each subgroup to be equivalent, hence the state of the system is fully specify by the set {nv, nc}
of the numbers of up voters nv and up contrarians nc, with n ≡ nv + nc being the total number
of up agents. Both voters and contrarians can change their state randomly with certain rates,
increasing and decreasing the number nv and nc. The dynamics implements a Markov chain with
the following rates pi±v,c for the allowed transitions:
• nv → nv + 1:
pi+v (nv, nc) =
(
av + hv
n
N
)
(Nv − nv), (1)
• nv → nv − 1:
pi−v (nv, nc) =
(
av + hv
N − n
N
)
nv, (2)
• nc → nc + 1:
pi+c (nv, nc) =
(
ac + hc
N − n
N
)
(Nc − nc), (3)
• nc → nc − 1:
pi−c (nv, nc) =
(
ac + hc
n
N
)
nc. (4)
The rates depend on the “noise” coefficients av and ac and the “herding” hv and “anti-herding”
hc coefficients. According to the chosen rates, a voter and a contrarian can change their states
regardless the state of the other agents with rates av and ac, respectively. Moreover, a voter can
also change her state with a rate proportional to the total number of agents holding the opposite
state than hers, while a contrarian changes state with a rate proportional to the number of agents
holding her state. In terms of pairwise interactions, the herding mechanism in equivalent to an
agent copying the state of another agent selected randomly with rate hv from the whole population,
while the anti-herding mechanism is equivalent to an agent copying the opposite state of another
agent again selected randomly with rate hv from the whole population. Observe that the rates
at Eqs. (1)–(4) are quadratic functions of nv and nc. However, pi
+
v,c + pi
−
v,c are linear functions, a
property that makes the system analytically solvable, see the discussion of Ref. [42] addressing
the case of the VM.
It is useful to rewrite the contrarian rates as that of the voter, as follows:
pi+c (nv, nc) =
(
a¯c + h¯c
n
N
)
(Nc − nc), (5)
pi−c (nv, nc) =
(
a¯c + h¯c
N − n
N
)
nc, (6)
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with
a¯c ≡ ac + hc (7)
and
h¯c ≡ −hc. (8)
That is, the contrarians can be seen as noisy voters with negative herding parameter
h¯c ≤ 0, (9)
but with a noisy coefficient greater of equal to −h¯c
a¯c ≥ −h¯c (10)
which insures the total rates to be non negative. As, similarly, a contrarian with negative herd-
ing acts as a voter, and in order to avoid inconsistent notation (contrarians behaving as voters or
viceversa), we consider, from now on, that all herding parameters are non negative hc, hv ≥ 0. By
construction, the noise coefficients can not be negative either, av, ac ≥ 0.
Agents can also adopt the radical form of “zealots”. They are agents that never change their
state. Formally a zealot is either a voter or a contrarian with ac,v = hv,c = 0, so the rate of changin
state is always zero. A zealot’s opinion is determined solely by its initial state.
2.1. The case of the two-role model
Suppose a system of N equivalent agents that can adopt the role a voter with probability 1 − p
and the role of a contrarian with probability p, as the TRM considered in Ref. [36]. The possibility
of an intrinsic change of state is here disregarded. Then the rates for the allowed transitions, using
the structure of the rates (1)–(4), read
pi+(n) = h
[
(1 − p)
n
N
+ p
N − n
N
]
(N − n), (11)
pi−(n) = h
[
(1 − p)
N − n
N
+ p
n
N
]
n, (12)
where h is a constant. Notice a slight difference of our rates if compared to that of Ref. [36]: in
our approach, when an agent adopts the role of a contrarian, her state changes taking into account
also her own state. The difference disappears for N ≫ 1.
After a rearrangement, the rates (11) and (12) can be written as
pi+(n) =
[
hp + h(1 − 2p)
n
N
]
(N − n), (13)
pi−(n) =
[
hp + h(1 − 2p)
N − n
N
]
n, (14)
which are a particular case of (1)–(2) if p < 1/2, and of (5)–(6) for p > 1/2.
For all said, the TRM studied in [36, 37] is a particular case (for N ≫ 1) of the general model
considered here. On the one hand, if the probability p, for a an agent of the TRM to be a contrarian,
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is smaller than 1/2 then the model is equivalent to an ensemble of noisy voters with noise hp and
herding h(1−2p). On the other hand, if p > 1/2 then the equivalence is with an ensemble of noisy
contrarians with noise hp and herding h(2p−1). Finally, for p = 1/2 we have a random walk with
transition rate h/2.
Once we have established the relationship between the two-role model of Ref. [36] and our
general model of voters and contrarians, we analyze the latter in detail and determine the possible
phases and transitions that it can present. Our intention is to identify whether consensus or co-
existence of opinions as a function of the system parameters and relative numbers of voters and
contrarians. We will also study the role of zealots in the final outcome of the dynamics.
3. Theory
At the mesoscopic level, the fundamental quantity is the probability P(nv, nc, t) of finding the
system in state {nv, nc} at time t. It satisfies the following master equation [43, 44]
∂
∂t
P(nv, nc, t) =
∑
k∈{v,c}
∑
s∈{+,−}
(E sk − 1)pi
−s
k (nv, nc)P(nv, nc, t), (15)
where E±v and E
±
c are the step operators defined such that E
±
v f (nv, nc) = f (nv±1, nc) and E
±
c f (nv, nc) =
f (nv, nc ± 1) for any function f (nv, nc). Equations for the moments
Mi j ≡
〈
nivn
j
c
〉
=
∑
nv
∑
nc
nivn
j
cP(nv, nc, t), i, j ∈ N, (16)
where 〈·〉 denotes an average over the probability function, can be easily inferred form Eq. (15) by
multiplying it by nivn
j
c and summing over all possible values of nv and nc. After some algebra, we
arrive at
dMi j
dt
=
∑
k∈{v,c}
∑
s∈{+,−}
〈
pisk(E
s
k − 1)n
i
vn
j
c
〉
. (17)
To obtain this equation, the following property has been used
〈
f (nv, nc)(E
s
k − 1)g(nv, nc)
〉
=
〈
g(nv, nc)(E
−s
k − 1) f (nv, nc)
〉
, (18)
valid for any pair of functions f and g
It turns out that the hierarchy of equations (17) can be closed at any order (value of i+ j) because∑
s∈{+,−}
〈
pis
k
(E s
k
− 1)nivn
j
c
〉
involves only moments of degree i+ j or less, a direct consequence of the
form of the rates. Namely, (E s
k
− 1)nivn
j
c is either zero or a polynomial of degree i + j − 1 whose
leading coefficient has different signs for different values of s. Hence the sum on the r.h.s. of Eq.
(17) is either zero or it involves the combination of pi+
k
− pi−
k
times a polynomial of degree i+ j− 1.
Since pi+
k
− pi−
k
is of degree one for the rates (1)–(4), we obtain the desired result.
We consider next the steady–state solutions of Eqs. (17). But first, it is more natural to take
the partial and global magnetizations, defined as
xv =
2nv
Nv
− 1; xc =
2nc
Nc
− 1; x =
2n
N
− 1 = xc + xv. (19)
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The new quantities take values in [−1, 1], and are correlated in general. It is not difficult to see that
the steady-state values of the moments of degree one are
〈nv〉 =
Nv
2
⇔ 〈xv〉 = 0, (20)
〈nc〉 =
Nc
2
⇔ 〈xc〉 = 0, (21)
in agreement with the symmetry of the problem. In a similar way, we can obtain the second
moments. However, the explicit expression are very long, and are given in Appendix A.
The knowledge of the second moments can be used to infer the phase of the system, through
the following result:
Lemma. Let the probability function P(x) : D → R+ be an even function, monotonic in D+, with
D = {xi ≡ −1 + 2i/N, i = 0, . . . ,N} and D
+ = {x ∈ D|x > 0}. Then P(x) is non-decreasing (resp.
non-increasing) in D+ if and only if
〈
x2
〉
≥ (resp. ≤)N+2
3N
. The equality holds when P(x) is constant.
Proof of the lemma. Under the hypothesis, P(x) can be either (a) non-decreasing and non-
constant, (b) non-increasing and non-constant, or (c) constant. Case (c) is evident. In case (a)
it is P(xi) ≤ P(xi+1) for i = 0, . . . ,N − 1. Take P˜(xi) = P(xi) −
1
N+1
, then P˜(xi) ≤ P˜(xi+1), and there
are two numbers im < iM so that P(xi) = 0 for im + 1 ≤ i ≤ iM − 1. Moreover, P(xi) < 0 (> 0)
for i ≤ im (i ≥ iM), and k ≡ −
∑
i≤im
P˜(xi) =
∑
i≥iM
P˜(xi) > 0. Hence,
〈
x2
〉
− N+2
3N
=
∑N
i=0 x
2
i
P˜(xi) =∑
i≤im
x2
i
P˜(xi) +
∑
i≥iM
x2
i
P˜(xi) ≥ x
2
im
∑
i≤im
P˜(xi) + x
2
iM
∑
i≥iM
P˜(xi) = k(x
2
iM
− x2
im
) > 0. Similarly, we
can prove (b). End of proof.
By symmetry considerations, P(xv), P(xc), and P(x) are even functions. In addition, if we
can prove that they are monotonic functions when their arguments are positive, then it follows
that there are three possible phases for the subsystem of voters and contrarians: the bimodal phase
(with x = 0 being the less probable value), the unimodal phase (with x = 0 being the most probable
value), and the plain phase as the border case. Next, we consider some cases separately.
3.1. The noisy voter model
When Nc = 0, we recover the noisy voter model. For this case, it was proven [15] that the
probability function P(x) for x > 0 is monotonic, and we can use the previous lemma. The second
moment is 〈
x2v
〉
=
2av + hv
2Nav + hv
, (22)
so for av/hv < 1/N, i.e.
〈
x2v
〉
> N+2
3N
, the system is in the bimodal phase; for av/hv > 1/N, i.e.〈
x2v
〉
< N+2
3N
, the system is in the unimodal phase; and for av/hv = 1/N, i.e.
〈
x2v
〉
= N+2
3N
, the system
is in the plain phase, as shown in Fig. 1, see [15] for further details.
A simple modification of this case, allows us to consider the influence of zealots in a sys-
tem of voters. Formally, we identify zealots as a set of Nc > 0 contrarian agents with zero rates,
ac = hc = 0. The state of the zealot is determined by the initial condition and it remains unchanged
during the evolution of the system. The distribution of the states of the voters then depends strongly
on the number and states of the zealots. If the number of zealots of opposite states are the same,
the so called balanced case, the bimodal and plain phases in the distribution of voters P(nc) always
6
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10-1
100
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101
〈 x
v2  
〉
av/hv
10-2
10-1
100
101
-1 -0.5  0  0.5  1
P(
x v)
N v
/2
xv
Figure 1: Second moments (left) and probability functions (right) for the magnetization of a system of Nv = 200
voters and no contrarians Nc = 0. Left: the line is from Eq. (22) and symbols are from the numerical simulations.
Right: numerical results for av/hv = 1/(5Nv) (convex bimodal function), 1/Nv (plain function), and 20/Nv (concave
unimodal function) showing the the possible three phases.
disappear. If the number of opposite zealots are different (unbalanced case) the system loses its
optimistic-pessimistic symmetry and two new phases appear (see [15] for details): an extreme
asymmetric (EA) phase (where the maximum of the probability distribution occurs at the consen-
sus value favored by the zealots) and an asymmetric unimodal (AU) phase where the maximum,
being still tilted towards the zealot-favored opinion, is located far from the extreme consensus
state.
3.2. Only contrarians
We now consider the case of only contrarians, i.e. Nv = 0. The master equation for P(n) with
n = nc can be easily written down, and from it we deduce the following useful relation for the
steady-states probability functions, see appendix C of [15],
P(n) =
pi+c (n − 1)
pi−c (n)
P(n − 1), n = 1, . . . ,N. (23)
Using the rates (3) and (4) we have
pi+c (n − 1)
pi−c (n)
=
(
ac + hc
N−n+1
N
)
(N − n + 1)(
ac + hc
n
N
)
n
(24)
which is smaller than 1 for n > N/2 and greater than 1 for n < N/2. Namely, the steady-state
probability function verifies the hypothesis of the lemma. Moreover, n = N/2 is always a global
maximum, and the only possible phase is the unimodal one. The same conclusion can be reached
by using the lemma: the exact expression for the second moment is
〈
x2c
〉
=
2ac + hc
2Nac + (2N − 1)hc
, (25)
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Using ac ≥ 0, N > 1, it follows immediately that
〈
x2c
〉
< (N + 2)/(3N), meaning (according to the
lemma) that the only possible phase is the unimodal one.
The expression in Eq. (25) is an increasing function of the noise coefficient ac, see Fig. 2,
meaning that the anti-herding (contrarian) mechanism is more efficient than the noise to lead the
system deep inside the unimodal phase, since the smaller the value of ac/hc the smaller the value
of
〈
x2c
〉
. The opposite behaviour is observed for the noisy voter model, i.e. Eq. (22) is a decreasing
function of av/hv. For ac ≫ hc we get
〈
x2c
〉
≃ 1/N, the anti-herding mechanism does not act, and
the behaviour of the system is the same as the noisy voter model for av = ac ≫ hv/Nv, as expected.
 2⋅10-3
 3⋅10-3
 4⋅10-3
 5⋅10-3
10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103
〈 x
c2  
〉
ac/hc
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
-6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6
P(
x c/
σ
)σN
c/2
xc/σ
Figure 2: Second moments (left) and probability functions (right) for a system of Nc = 200 contrarians and no voters
Nv = 0. Left: the line is from Eq. (25) and symbols are from the numerical simulations. Right: numerical results for
av/hv = 10
−3 (squares), 10−1 (circles), and 102 (triangles). The data has been scaled with their variance σ ≡
√〈
x2c
〉
,
and the line is a Gaussian distribution with unit variance.
It is also possible to study the effect that zealots have in a system of contrarians. Similarly to
the previous subsection we just need to consider a set of Nv > 0 voters with av = hv = 0, that will
act as zealots. In the balanced case of an even number Nv of zealots, with the same number of
zealots having opposite states, i.e. nv = Nv/2, we can consider the effect that zealots have on the
contrarian rates, rewriting Eqs.(3,4) as:
pi+c (nv, nc) =
(
ac + hc
N − n
N
)
(Nc − nc) =
(
a˜c + h˜c
Nc − nc
Nc
)
(Nc − nc), (26)
pi−c (nv, nc) =
(
ac + hc
n
N
)
nc =
(
a˜c + h˜c
nc
Nc
)
nc, (27)
with effective noise and herding coefficients,
a˜c = ac + hc
Nv
2N,
(28)
h˜c =
Nchc
N
, (29)
meaning that the roles of zealots on a set of contrarian agents is to increase the effective noise and
to decrease the anti-herding constant. As a consequence, the system keeps always in the unimodal
phase.
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3.3. Noisy voters under the influence of extreme contrarians
We consider in this subsection a more general case with a mixture of voters and contrarians.
Moreover, since we have already seen that the noise mechanism diminishes the contrarian effect,
from now on we set ac = 0, so that the effect of the contrarians will be tuned only through changing
hc and Nc. This way, the relevant free parameters become av/hv, hc/hv, Nv, and Nc. A contrarian
with ac = 0 never changes spontaneously its state and will be termed as a “extreme“ contrarian.
Take the subsystem of voters. From the exact expression of
〈
x2v
〉
, see Appendix A, we can
compute the values of the parameters where the different phases appear, as previously discussed.
By imposing
〈
x2v
〉
=
Nv + 2
3Nv
we obtain the critical values of av = av(hc/hv,Nv,Nc) as the (positive)
solution of the quadratic equation
Aa2v + Bav + C = 0, (30)
where
A = 2(Nv + Nc)(2Nc + Nv − 1) > 0, (31)
B = N2vhc/hv + 2(2Nc − 1)[(hc/hv + 1)Nc − 1] + [(4hc/hv + 3)Nc − 3 − hc/hv]Nv, (32)
C = 1 + hc/hv(Nc − 1)(Nv + 2Nc − 1) + (Nc − 4)Nc. (33)
As A, B > 0, a positive solution to Eq. (30) requires C < 0. If C > 0 all solutions will be negative
and, effectively, there are no transitions between different phases, being the unimodal the only
possible phase. The limiting case happens when C = 0, or
hc
hv
=
(4 − Nc)Nc − 1
(Nc − 1)(Nv + 2Nc − 1)
. (34)
As hc, hv ≥ 0, this condition can only be fulfilled if (4 − Nc)Nc ≥ 1, or Nc = 1, 2, 3. In summary,
for Nc ≥ 4 the only possible outcome is the unimodal distribution of up voters. On the other hand,
for Nc = 0, 1, 2, 3 it is possible to switch from the unimodal to the bimodal phase, passing through
the plain phase, by varying the parameters av, hv, hc. The phase diagram is sketched in Fig. 3.
Let us consider that Nc ≤ 3, so the voters can be in the bimodal phase. If we now take the
limit of hc/hv → 0, one could naively expect that the contrarians behave like zealots. But this is
not the case, as can be seen from Eq. (34). Take, for instance, two contrarians Nc = 2 that initially
have opposite opinions. For hc/hv = 0, i.e. the contrarians being zealots, voters are always in the
unimodal phase, as already said in a previous subsection. However, for 0 < hc/hv < 3/(Nv + 3) the
voters are in the bimodal phase, even if hc/hv ≪ 1. The singularity of the limit hc/hv → 0 has to
do with the time needed for the system to reach the steady state. While for hc/hv = 0 the relaxing
time is of order of (av + hv)
−1, for hc/hv ≪ av/hv it is or order of h
−1
c .
Another important observation concerns the region of existence of the bimodal phase that
disappears for Nv,Nc → ∞ (finite-size character of the transitions). For the case of the noisy
voter model, both with and without the influence of contrarians (and zealots), the bimodal phase
disappears with a small amount of noise av ∼ hv/N, a small number of contrarians Nc/Nv ∼ 4/Nv,
and/or a small value of the anti-herding parameter hc ∼ hv/Nv. For Nc ∼ Nv both subgroups of
agents are typically very deep in the unimodal phase.
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 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 1  2  3  4
N
(h c
/h
v)
Nc
3 phases
Unimodal phase
 1⋅10-2
 5⋅10-2
 3⋅10-1
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101
〈 x
2 v 
〉
av/hv
 1⋅10-2
 5⋅10-2
 3⋅10-1
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101
〈 x
2 v 
〉
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Figure 3: Left: A phase diagram with two regions: below the critical line the voters can be in the three phases,
depending on the value of av, while above the critical line only the unimodal phase is possible. The exact position of
the critical line depends on the value of Nv, however this dependence is through the prefactor N/(N + Nc − 1) ≃ 1 for
N ≫ 1. Center and right: Numerical results (symbols) and theory (lines) for the second moment of the magnetization
of a system of voters under the influence of extreme contrarians as a function of the noisy to herding ratio av/hv, and for
hc/hv/(hc/hv)0 = 10
−1 (black square), 1 (red circles), and 10 (blue triangle), with (hc/hv)c given by Eq. (34). Center:
Nv = 197 and Nc = 3. Right: Nv = 196 and Nc = 4. The dashed horizontal line is the value
〈
x2v
〉
= (Nv + 2)/(3Nv) for
which the bimodal-unimodal transition occurs.
3.4. The unimodal phases
We have already seen that the most common phase for both the voters and the contrarians is
the unimodal phase. This is very apparent if the constants are the same for both kind of agents,
and/or Nc ∼ Nv ≫ 1. Moreover, if both kind of agents are deep inside the unimodal phase, e.g. if
the noise is big enough, then we expect the two communities to decouple, in the sense specified
below.
First, we derive an equation for the marginal probability functions P(nv) and P(nc) from the
master equation (15). By summing Eq. (15) over all possible values of nc, we get the following
equation
∂
∂t
P(nv, t) =
∑
s∈{+,−}
(E sv − 1)
Nc∑
nc=0
pi−sv (nv, nc)P(nv, nc, t) (35)
and a similar one for P(nc, t). Now we introduce the fundamental assumptions∑
nc
pi−sv (nv, nc)P(nv, nc, t) ≃ pi
−s
v (nv, 〈nc〉)P(nv, t) (36)
and the analogous one for the contrarians. This way, we obtain the following system of equations:
∂
∂t
P(nv, t) ≃
∑
l∈{+,−}
(Elv − 1)pi
−l
v (nv, 〈nc〉)P(nv, t), (37)
∂
∂t
P(nc, t) ≃
∑
l∈{+,−}
(Elc − 1)pi
−l
c (〈nv〉 , nc)P(nc, t). (38)
For the steady-state solutions, and due to the up-down symmetry, the two equations decouple one
from the other. More specifically, since 〈nv〉 = Nv/2 and 〈nc〉 = Nc/2, the rates become
pi+v (nv, 〈nc〉) =
(
a˜v + h˜v
nv
Nv
)
(Nv − nv); pi
−
v (nv, 〈nc〉) =
(
a˜v + h˜v
Nv − nv
Nv
)
nv, (39)
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where a˜v = av +
Nc
2N
hv and h˜v =
Nv
N
hv, and
pi+c (〈nv〉 , nc) =
(
a˜c + h˜c
Nc − nc
Nc
)
(Nc − nc); pi
−
c (〈nv〉 , nc) =
(
a˜c + h˜c
nc
Nc
)
nc, (40)
with a˜c = ac +
Nv
2N
hc and h˜c =
Nc
N
hc. The respective second moments become, after using Eqs. (22)
and (25), 〈
x2v
〉
≃
2a˜v + h˜v
2Nva˜v + h˜v
=
2av + hv
2Nvav +
Nv(Nc+1)
N
hv
≤
av≥0
Nv + Nc
Nv(1 + Nc)
≤
Nc≥2
Nv + 2
3Nv
, (41)
and 〈
x2c
〉
≃
2a˜c + h˜c
2Nca˜c + (2Nc − 1)h˜c
=
1
Nc
2ac + hc
2ac +
N+Nc−1
N
hc
≤
1
Nc
≤
Nc + 2
3Nc
. (42)
See Fig. 4 where we compare the latter approximate expression with exact ones and numerical
results.
 5⋅10-3
 1⋅10-2
 2⋅10-2
 3⋅10-2
10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102
〈 x
2 v 
〉
av/hv
 3⋅10-3
 1⋅10-2
 3⋅10-2
10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102
〈 x
2 c 
〉
av/hv
-0.0075
-0.005
 0
10-3 10-2 10-1 100 101 102
〈 x
vx
c 
〉
av/hv
Figure 4: Numerical (symbols), exact (solid lines), and approximate results of Eqs. (41) and (42) (dashed lines) for
the second moments of the magnetization of a system of 200 agents, and Nv = 50 (black squares), 100 (red circles),
and 150 (blue triangle) voters as a function of noisy to herding ratio. Voters and contrarians have the same rates,
av = av and hv = hc.
We can also obtain approximate expressions for the probability functions. Following the well-
known approach of [43], if the numbers of voters Nv and contrarians Nc are large, then the dis-
tributions are solution to the Fokker-Planck equations resulting form Taylor expanding the r.h.s
of the master equations (37) and (38) up to second order in 1/Nv and 1/Nc. For the steady-state
solutions, the equations are
d
dxv
[2a˜vxvP(xv)] +
1
2N
d2
dx2v
{[
4a˜v + 2h˜v(1 − x
2
v)
]
P(xv)
}
= 0, (43)
which was obtained previously in [45], and
d
dxc
[
2(a˜c + h˜c)xcP(xc)
]
+
1
2N
d2
dx2c
{[
4a˜c + 2h˜c(1 + x
2
c)
]
P(xc)
}
= 0. (44)
The corresponding solutions are
P(xv) =
1
Zv
(
1 −
1
2Nva˜v/h˜v + 1
x2v〈
x2v
〉
) Nva˜v
h˜v
−1
−→
Nva˜v/h˜v≫1
exp
(
−
x2v
2〈x2v〉
)
√
2pi
〈
x2v
〉 , (45)
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and
P(xc) =
1
Zc
1 + 1
2
(
a˜c/h˜c + 1
)
Nc − 1
x2c〈
x2c
〉

−(a˜c/h˜c+1)Nc−1
−→
Nc(a˜c/h˜c+1)≫1
exp
(
−
x2c
2〈x2c〉
)
√
2pi
〈
x2c
〉 , (46)
where Zv and Zc are normalization constants. The Gaussian approximations are verified in Fig. 5
for one representative case.
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10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
-6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6
P(
x v/
σ
)σN
v/2
xv/σ
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
-6 -4 -2  0  2  4  6
P(
x c/
σ
)σN
c/2
xc/σ
Figure 5: Scaled probability functions for a system of 100 voters (left) and 100 contrarians (right) for hc = hv and
av/hv = ac/hv = 10
−3 (black squares), 10−1 (red circles), and 102 (blue triangle). For each set of data, it isσ =
√〈
x2v,c
〉
.
The solid line is the guassian distribution with zero mean and unit variance.
4. Conclusions
An agent-based model of voters and contrarians have been proposed and studied at the mean-
field level (all-to-all interactions). The voters follow the noisy voter model dynamics, while the
contrarians can change state by copying opposite states or by means of and intrinsic noise. The
model is quite general, analytically tractable, and reduces to simpler ones: the (noisy) voter model
(with and without zealots), the only-contrarians model (with and without zealots), and the two-role
model, among others.
Contrarians and voters behave differently if analyzed separately. The former always reach a
steady state with a concave probability function (the bimodal phase), which in turns is very close
to a Gaussian distribution. Moreover, the second moment of the distribution of contrarians is an
increasing function of the noisy to anti-herding ratio, meaning that it is always smaller than that of
system of noisy voters, the two quantities being coincident only when the intrinsic noises are the
only source of transitions between opinions.
In general, the presence of a small amount of contrarians modifies the dynamics of the voters
critically. Particularly, if the number of contrarians is smaller than 4, the noisy voters can be in
the bimodal, plain, and unimodal phases, depending on the value of their intrinsic noise. For
the number of contrarians bigger or equal to four, however, the phase transition disappears, and
only the unimodal phase, both for the voters and contrarians, prevails. The situation is similar
to that described by Galam using his majority model [19], the main difference happening when
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the number of contrarians is below the critical value: the bimodal phase of our model preserves
the up-down (optimistic-pessimistic) symmetry, while the Galam model reaches a state with the
fractions of agents with different opinions being different.
When the numbers of voters and contrarians are of the same order, the probability distribution
of contrarians is almost a Gaussian distribution. In addition, if the voter noise and herding co-
efficients are of the same order, the dynamics of voters and contrarians decouple, although their
respective transition rates for voters and contrarians depend on the number of agents of each kind.
In this latter case, the probability function of voters is also very close to the Gaussian distribution.
Appendix A. Second moments
The exact expressions for the steady-state second moments of a general mixture of voters and
contrarians are:
〈
x2v
〉
= [(2av + hv)Nv(−hc(2av + 2ac + hv + hc) + (2ac + hc)(2(av + ac) + hc)Nv)
+(−4a2vhc − 2(2av + hv)hc(hv + hc) − 2ac(2avhc + hv(hv + hc))
+(4ac(4av(av + ac) + (3av + 2ac)hv + h
2
v) + (12av(av + 2ac) + 2(5av + 6ac)hv + 3h
2
v)hc
+4(2av + hv)h
2
c)Nv)Nc + 2(2av + hv)(ac + hc)(2av + 2ac + hv + 2hc)N
2
c ]
×[Nv(4a
2
v(Nv + Nc)(2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc))
+2av((2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc))(2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(Nv + 2Nc))
+hv(2ac(Nv + Nc)(1 + 2Nc) + hc(−1 + 3NvNc + 4N
2
c )))
+hv(4a
2
c(1 + Nc)(Nv + Nc) + hc(hc(1 + 2Nc)(−1 + Nv + 2Nc) + hv(−1 + Nc + 2N
2
c ))
+2ac(hvNc(1 + Nc) + hc(−1 + 2Nv + 2Nc + 3NvNc + 4N
2
c ))))]
−1, (A.1)
〈
x2c
〉
= [4a2v(2ac + hc)(Nv + Nc)
2 + hv(4a
2
c(1 + Nc)(Nv + Nc) + hcNc(hv + hc + 3hcNv + hvNc + 2hcNc)
+2ac(hvNc(1 + Nc) + hc(Nv + Nc)(2 + 3Nc)))
+2av(4a
2
c(Nv + Nc)
2 + 2ac(Nv + Nc)(hv + 2hcNv + 2hvNc + 3hcNc)
+hc(hv(Nv + Nc)(1 + 2Nc) + hc((−1 + Nv)Nv + 4NvNc + 2N
2
c )))]
×[Nc(4a
2
v(Nv + Nc)(2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc))
+2av((2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc))(2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(Nv + 2Nc))
+hv(2ac(Nv + Nc)(1 + 2Nc) + hc(−1 + 3NvNc + 4N
2
c )))
+hv(4a
2
c(1 + Nc)(Nv + Nc) + hc(hc(1 + 2Nc)(−1 + Nv + 2Nc) + hv(−1 + Nc + 2N
2
c ))
+2ac(hvNc(1 + Nc) + hc(−1 + 2Nv + 2Nc + 3NvNc + 4N
2
c ))))]
−1, (A.2)
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〈xvxc〉 = [2ac(h
2
v(1 + Nc) + hv(2av − hc)(Nv + Nc) − 2avhc(Nv + Nc))
+hc(h
2
v(1 + Nc) − 2avhc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc) + hv(2av(Nv + Nc) − hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc)))]
×[4a2v(Nv + Nc)(2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc))
+2av((2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(−1 + Nv + 2Nc))(2ac(Nv + Nc) + hc(Nv + 2Nc))
+hv(2ac(Nv + Nc)(1 + 2Nc) + hc(−1 + 3NvNc + 4N
2
c ))) + hv(4a
2
c(1 + Nc)(Nv + Nc)
+hc(hc(1 + 2Nc)(−1 + Nv + 2Nc) + hv(−1 + Nc + 2N
2
c ))
+2ac(hvNc(1 + Nc) + hc(−1 + 2Nv + 2Nc + 3NvNc + 4N
2
c )))]
−1. (A.3)
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